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89-1063.S
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Subject: FIRSTIER MTGE. CO. v. INVESTORS MTGE. INS. CO., Syllabus
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as
is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is
issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but
has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the
reader. See United States v. Detroit Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus
FIRSTIER MORTGAGE CO., aka REALBANC, INC. v. INVESTORS MORTGAGE INSURANCE
CO.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the tenth circuit
No. 89-1063. Argued October 10, 1990 -- Decided January 15, 1991
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(2) provides that a "notice of
appeal filed after the announcement of a decision or order but before the
entry of the judgment or order shall be treated as filed after such entry
and on the day thereof." On January 26, 1989, the District Court announced
from the bench that it intended to grant a motion for summary judgment
filed by respondent Investors Mortgage Insurance Co. (IMI) in a suit
brought by petitioner FirsTier Mortgage Co. against IMI, requested that the
parties file proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law to support
that ruling, and clarified that its ruling extinguished all of FirsTier's
claims. FirsTier filed a notice of appeal on February 8, identifying the
January 26 ruling as the decision from which it was appealing, but the
District Court did not enter judgment until March 3. The Court of Appeals
dismissed the appeal on the ground that the January 26 decision was not a
final decision appealable under 28 U. S. C. MDRV 1291.
Held: Rule 4(a)(2) permits a notice of appeal filed from a nonfinal
decision to serve as an effective notice of appeal from a subsequently
entered final judgment when a district court announces a decision that
would be appealable if immediately followed by the entry of judgment. In
such an instance, it would be reasonable for a litigant to believe that the
decision is final, and permitting a notice of appeal to become effective
when judgment is entered would not catch the appellee by surprise. This
interpretation of the Rule best comports with its drafters' intent. And it
does not contravene Rule 1(b)'s prohibition on construing the appellate
rules to extend or limit courts' jurisdiction as established by law. Even
if a bench ruling were not final under MDRV 1291, Rule 4(a)(2) would not
render that ruling appealable in contravention of MDRV 1291. Rather, it
treats the premature notice as a notice filed from the subsequently entered
judgment. The instant bench ruling is a "decision" under the Rule. It
purported to dispose of all of FirsTier's claims and would have been final
under MDRV 1291 had the judge set forth his judgment immediately and the
clerk entered the judgment on the docket. FirsTier's confusion as to the
litigation's status was understandable, and no unfairness to IMI results
from allowing the appeal to go forward.
Reversed and remanded.
Marshall, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Kennedy, J.,
filed a concurring opinion.
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